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Debate on Birthright Citizenship 
Dr. John Eastman∗ & Professor Ediberto Román∗∗ 
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The following is the transcript from a debate between Dr. John 
Eastman and Professor Ediberto Román, and moderated by Dean of 
the Florida International University College of Law, Alex Acosta.  This 
debate took place on February 24-25, 2011 as a part of the FIU Law 
Review’s Symposium on immigration reform in the United States.  Spe-
cifically, this debate centers on the Fourteenth Amendment and birth-
right citizenship.  Both Dr. Eastman and Professor Román were given 
ten minutes for their own remarks, beginning with Dr. Eastman.  After 
the opening remarks, the debate goes into a brief back-and-forth be-
tween Dr. Eastman and Professor Roman before concluding with ques-
tions from the audience.   
 
JOHN EASTMAN:  Thank you, Dean Acosta, Professor, all of 
you.  I wish I could have been with you for the whole conference.  The 
other duties of an academic and litigator sometimes intrude.  But it 
looked to be a very interesting conference, and I’m delighted to be 
here to see your beautiful facility and to spend some time in south 
Florida.  Although you have this thing called “humidity” that we don’t 
have over in California.  I’m still getting used to it.  
Before I begin my formal remarks about the birthright citizen-
ship controversy, I want to put it into a larger context about the larger 
debate over illegal immigration.  And I stress the word “illegal.”  Most 
of what I heard this morning, the comment about anti-immigration, 
while true on some segment of the political spectrum of folks on my 
side of these issues, is a fairly narrow segment, just as there’s a narrow 
segment of fairly extreme folks on the other side who claim, for ex-
                                                                                                                           
stitutional law, critical race theory, post-colonial discourse, affirmative action, and law and litera-
ture.  His first two books on colonialism, citizenship, and nationality – The Other American 
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ample, California’s not part of the United States.  And I think we 
ought to focus on the distinction between legal and illegal, because 
that’s what drives most of the policy discussion.  
The second thing I want to talk about is this:  I agree with, I sus-
pect, most of you in this room, certainly most of those that have been 
participating in the conference thus far, that the current situation is 
not only deplorable, but immoral.  What we’ve done in creating a class 
of outlaws living among us who don’t have recourse to the law, who 
don’t have recourse to employment or education opportunities, I think 
is terrible.  And one has to stand back and ask why that is.  On the one 
hand, it’s easy to say, “Well, we’ve just got a bunch of nativists anti-
immigrant folks in this country that don’t want to open the doors.”  I 
do not think that is true.  And proof that it’s not true, I think, that my 
former boss, Ronald Reagan, while president, signed the first large 
amnesty, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  The issue, 
rather, is how to provide a system or mechanism that prevents the 
incentives for creating that unlawful presence in the United States, 
that creates a population that could be preyed upon, either by public 
officials in this country or by unscrupulous people who will take ad-
vantage of them.  And the premise of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act was, by giving amnesty, we would also stop the incentives 
for future illegal immigration that would exacerbate the problem that 
the amnesty was designed to prevent.  
Now, what we found as a result of the amnesty was that word 
went out that if they did it once, if we overwhelmed them with num-
bers, they will do it again.  And it created an even greater incentive to 
create an unlawful population and exacerbated the problem.  And so I 
want to try, instead of repeating that same strategy from before, look 
at ways to remove the four incentives to illegal immigration, to put 
pressure on Congress to increase, radically increase, legal immigration, 
and streamline the process.  And I think as long as you’ve got that 
safety valve of illegal immigration, the pressures won’t be brought to 
bear to increase that.  
And so what are the four principle magnets?  Well, one is an un-
enforced, porous border.  The second is employment opportunity.  The 
third are social welfare benefits across the spectrum.  And the fourth 
is the one we’re going to talk about today: birthright citizenship – that 
automatic citizenship conveyed upon anyone born on U.S. soil, or so 
the current understanding goes.  I think that current understanding is 
actually wrong, as a matter of first principle of what the Fourteenth 
Amendment actually says and what it was intended to do.  And I’m 
going to lay out the case about why I think the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not provide automatic citizenship for anyone born on U.S.  
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The language of the Fourteenth Amendment of course has two 
discreet elements.  “All persons born – that’s the born on U.S. soil part 
– or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.”  Two elements: birth and being subject to the jurisdiction.  
Now, in our common parlance today, “subject to the jurisdiction” 
means that you are subject to our laws.  And anybody that is physi-
cally present within the United States is subject to our jurisdiction in 
that sense.  But that makes that phrase almost entirely redundant - the 
birth on U.S. soil phrase.  We tend to avoid interpretations that write 
redundancies into the Constitution.   
Now, there is an interpretation of “subject to the jurisdiction” that 
makes it not redundant, although only in a minor way.  This language, 
some have argued, was intended simply to exclude the children of dip-
lomats or the children of occupying enemy armies.  I think it actually 
did more than that.  And if you look at the legislative history, the de-
bates on the floor of the Senate where the citizenship clause – re-
member when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed out of the 
House of Representatives, it did not have a citizenship clause.  It was 
introduced by Senator Howard on the floor of the Senate.  And he 
was, during the course of the discussions, asked precisely, “What do 
you mean by this citizenship?”  And everybody understood what they 
were trying to do with the Fourteenth Amendment was constitutional-
ize the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  The 1866 Civil Rights Act, they thought, 
was on uncertain constitutional terms, whether Congress had ex-
ceeded its authority under the powers given to it under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  And even if it was constitutionally valid, they were con-
cerned that a future Congress might repeal the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  
So they wanted to lock it into the Constitution.  And that was the 
principle purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
And with respect to the Citizenship Clause, the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act, I think, is very clear.  It said, “All persons born in the United 
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not 
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”  Now, 
you might argue that “not subject to any foreign power” is more clear 
on the question of whether somebody born here to parents who are 
subject to foreign powers, who are still citizens of Ireland or Mexico or 
Japan or what have you, would clearly not be citizens under the 1866 
Civil Rights Act.  Maybe the change in language to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction,” was intended to broaden 
the grant of citizenship.  If you look at the debates, though, you will 
see that the change had one purpose in mind.  When it said “not sub-
ject to any foreign power,” the issue was whether children of Native 
Americans, “Indians” in their terminology, were automatically citizens.  
2011] Debate on Birthright Citizenship 297 
They weren’t subject to a foreign power, because the Indian tribes 
were domestic powers; separate sovereigns, to be sure, but domestic, 
not foreign.  And that created some problems under the 1866 Act’s 
language.  So the sole purpose of the change in language was to avoid 
that issue.  
Then Senator Lyman Trumbull was asked point blank, “Well, 
what do you mean?  Doesn’t this mean that Indians living on the res-
ervation are going to be covered by your new clause since they were, 
quote, ‘most clearly subject to our jurisdiction both civil and mili-
tary?”  Senator Lyman Trumbull, who is one of the key figures in the 
drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, responded, 
“What the phrase that we’re using means is that it’s complete jurisdic-
tion, not owing allegiance to anybody else.”  And Senator Jacob How-
ard, who actually introduced the language of this Clause, contended 
that it should be construed to mean “full and complete jurisdiction,” 
the same extent that we have now under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  
Now, to try and clarify what this distinction they were drawing is, 
think about tourists from Great Britain, from London, who come over 
here on a temporary vacation.  They are subject to our partial jurisdic-
tion while they’re here.  They have to follow our traffic laws.  They 
have to follow a lot of laws.  They drive on the right side of the road 
rather than the wrong side – I mean the left side! – of the road while 
they’re here.  But we don’t draft them into the Army.  They don’t get 
prosecuted for treason if they take up arms against us.  They don’t owe 
allegiance to our country, because they remain citizens of their sover-
eign, Great Britain.  Partial and territorial jurisdiction versus this 
broader, complete jurisdiction is what Howard and Trumbull both say 
they had in mind.  
Now, it’s not just the debates in Congress.  The first executive de-
cision on this reached the same conclusion.  Attorney General Wil-
liams in 1873 takes up the issue on what it means, when dealing with 
an interpretation of the Expatriation Act that was addressed at the 
same time.  He wrote: “The citizenship clause, the words are ‘jurisdic-
tion’ in it must be understood to mean ‘absolute or complete jurisdic-
tion.’  Aliens, among whom are persons born here but naturalized 
abroad, dwelling or being in this country are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States only to a limited extent.  Political and military 
rights and duties do not pertain to them.” 
Moving to the first Supreme Court cases to look at the issue:  In 
The Slaughterhouse Cases
1, which is the first Supreme Court case to 
look at anything dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
                                                                                                                           
 1 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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preme Court agreed with the interpretation I have described.  Grant-
ed, in Slaughterhouse the language is dicta, because this particular 
question wasn’t presented.  But in reaching their holding in Slaughter-
house, the Justices looked to the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and here’s what the majority in the case wrote: “The phrase was 
intended to exclude from its operation the children of ministers, coun-
cils, and citizens or subjects of foreign states who are born within the 
United States.”  And there was no dispute on that issue between the 
majority and the dissent.  Their dispute in the case was on other issues.   
Again, that was clearly dicta, but in Elk v. Wilkins2 in 1884, the 
Supreme Court directly interpreted the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  There was an Indian who had been born on 
U.S. soil, but owed allegiance to the tribe.  When he came of age, he 
renounced his allegiance to the tribe and he asked to be treated as a 
U.S. citizen because of his birth on U.S. soil.  The Court there said, “No.  
At the time you were born, you owed your immediate allegiance to 
your tribe, a separate sovereign, not to the United States, and that 
does not qualify for ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 
It is true that in 1898, the Court took a different turn, in a case 
dealing with a Chinese-American born on U.S. soil to parents were 
lawfully and permanently here.  The court held that Wong Kim Ark’s 
birth on U.S. soil was sufficient for him to be a citizen.3  But by being 
lawful, permanent residents, his parents had a degree of allegiance 
different in kind than those who are here only temporarily, and cer-
tainly those who are here unlawfully.  The treatise writers of the day, 
what have you, I think all agreed with this interpretation.  
So let me close with this, because I’m at the end of my ten min-
utes, and this is kind of the underlying theory of it.  This, I think, is 
more in line with the principle in the Declaration of Independence, 
that we create systems of political government by consent of the gov-
erned, mutual consent.  The old jus soli doctrine – once born on the 
King’s soil, always the King’s subject – is something we renounced in 
the Declaration of Independence.  I think this bilateral consent under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment, that I believe they actually 
intended to codify in the Fourteenth Amendment, is more compatible 
with that principle of the Declaration of Independence.  
Now, that’s not to say that we shouldn’t be offering, as a matter of 
policy, citizenship to all sorts of different categories of people.  But 
under our Constitution, the authority, the discretionary power, the 
                                                                                                                           
 2 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 3 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
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plenary power, to make those policy judgments is vested in Congress 
in Article One’s naturalization clause.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
sets a floor that they can’t go below, but how far above that floor they 
choose to go is a matter of the policy judgment of Congress.  Thank 
you very much.  
[applause] 
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  First, I want to thank Professor Eastman 
for attending this symposium and making it a lively event.  As you all 
witnessed, he has a great ability in terms of making a very strong ar-
gument, and without question in terms of being a scholarly leader, and 
an activist in certain circles.  
Unfortunately, in this context, his position, while having some 
force at first glance, is not nearly as impressive as he is. In terms of this 
issue, I have just about every conceivable way to address interpreta-
tion and language on my side. First, supporting my position are nu-
merous United States Supreme Court decisions, as well as executive 
actions, and the very language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  
Nevertheless, I want to start with a point that Professor Eastman sug-
gested – that the language of “being born” and “being subject to” is 
redundant. Shortly after making that assertion, Professor Eastman 
conceded the likelihood, or certainly the possibility, that the drafters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment were talking about diplomats and Na-
tive Americans.  So it appears, as Eastman Acknowledged, that the 
“subject to” language was not redundant, and the legislative history 
supports my interpretation. 
In addition to the legislative history of the Fourteenth amend-
ment, which I will address shortly, support for my position stems from 
the common law view of birthright, the legislative understanding of 
the term “subject to jurisdiction,” the legislative understanding and 
the plain meaning of the “subject to” language at that time, the subse-
quent understanding of that Fourteenth Amendment by the United 
States Supreme Court, and a long history of consistent executive and 
executive agency interpretations.  My last point is one I suspect in 
which Professor Eastman would agree.  I could characterize it as sim-
ple logic – if we follow Professor Eastman’s proposal, we would lead 
to arguably be inconsistent and absurd results.  
At this point I think both sides would agree that the legislative 
history on the issue is determinative.  As Professor Eastman alluded 
to, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress looked 
closely to the Civil Rights Act of 1886.  In terms of the debate of that 
issue, in terms of key language, Senator Cowan asked Senator Trum-
bull whether this language, language of “being born and not subject to 
any foreign power,” would make children of Chinese and Gypsies, 
who were born in this country, citizens.  Trumbull replied, “Undoubt-
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edly.”  This fact is terribly important in this context.  Because when we 
look at the issue of the Chinese, at that time, they could not naturalize 
because of the Naturalization Act of 1790.  So even looking at Profes-
sor Eastman’s approach, the Chinese were not under the full and com-
plete jurisdiction of the United States.  Yet under the Civil Rights Act, 
Trumbull, the person who sponsored the Act, would make them citi-
zens.  Moreover, in the context of Gypsies, it is quite interesting be-
cause there was some real debate as to whether the United States 
even had Gypsies at the time.  But more importantly, they were analo-
gous to the undocumented people of today – a silent and shadow 
population.  And in both instances, Trumbull in responding to Sena-
tor’s Cowan’s question, unequivocally stated they would be U.S. citi-
zens by birth.  
In terms of issues of birthright citizenship, other important docu-
ments at the time shed considerable light.  In particular, a letter from 
Senator Trumbull to President Andrew Johnson unequivocally states 
that birthright citizenship is dependent on whether the parents of the 
children born in the United States were permanently living, domiciled, 
in the United States.  So as opposed to a notion of allegiance – what 
we’re really talking about was domicile – which is not only consistent 
with the language that I alluded to in terms of the legislative history, 
but also with hundreds of years of federal court interpretation and 
executive branch action.   
In terms of the amendment itself, the Senate debate was enlight-
ening.  There really wasn’t a House debate.  In terms of one of the first 
important indications, Senator Benjamin Wade, during an important 
discussion on the issue, said, “I have always believed that every person 
of whatever race or color who was born within the United States was, 
in fact, a citizen.”  The immediate subsequent exchange sheds even 
more light.  Evidently Senator Wade was being questioned – perhaps 
cynically – and he responded “The Senator from Maine, Senator Pitt, 
suggests to me in an undertone that persons may be born in the 
United States and yet not be citizens.  Most assuredly they would be 
citizens of the United States, unless they went to another country and 
expatriated.”   
The last two legislative exchanges on the matter seals the issue.  
Senator Fessenden then raised the very issue before us.  He says, 
“Suppose a person is born here of parents from abroad temporarily in 
this county?”   Senator Wade observes  “I know that this is so in one 
instance in the case of children of foreign ministers who reside near 
the United States.  I agree to that position.  But my answer to the sug-
gestion that it’s a simple matter, one involving one, two, three or four 
individuals, and it would be best not to alter the law of citizenship for 
that case.” 
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Later, Senator Conness, a naturalized citizen himself, observed, 
“The proposition before us I will say, Mr. President, relates to the chil-
dren begotten of Chinese parents in California,” that was the  great 
fear of the day, “...shall be citizens.  I voted for the proposition to de-
clare that children of all parentage whatsoever, born in California, 
should be regarded as citizens of the United States.”  Thus, the legisla-
tive history of the Congress enacting the Fourteenth Amendment is 
consistent—and that consistent interpretation was that if one is born 
in the United States, one was to be considered a U.S. Citizen.  
Now, I’m fairly confident Professor Eastman will refer to certain 
legislative history that suggests some ambiguity, particularly in the 
context of allegiance.  That language, I propose to you, and I would 
strongly suggest you research on your own, as I often ask my students 
to do in class, relates to, and merely confirms, a legal fiction then and 
still in existence concerning Native Americans as being subject to an-
other jurisdiction—their own. This language in question, which Profes-
sor Eastman will likely use, was part of the legislative history because 
the congressman in question were seeking to confirm that the fiction 
associated with the treatment of indigenous people would still be in 
place after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; the fiction of a 
sovereign within a sovereign, which created an illogical and even ab-
surd paradox. Thus, that language was in the congressional debate 
merely as an effort to be consistent with an already recognized excep-
tion to the Fourteenth Amendment; it was not creating a rule or inter-
pretation on the citizenship status of persons born in the United 
States. 
Basically the Fourteenth Amendment is viewed to have codified 
the centuries old common language of jus soli providing for birthright 
citizenship for every person born on British soil.  And much like the 
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1886 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, the exceptions were the same, basically dealing 
with foreign diplomats and foreign combatants.  Thus, the legislative 
history suggests, indeed strongly suggests, that the “subject to” lan-
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment meant “under the authority of” 
or following the potential punishment, let’s say, of the power of the 
government.  
But the most relevant language relating to the “subject to” lan-
guage cam from Senator Jacob Howard, the amendment’s sponsor, 
where he said, “The word ‘jurisdiction’ ought to be construed so as to 
imply full and complete jurisdiction.  The United States’ courts have 
no power to punish an Indian who is connected with a tribe for a 
crime committed by him,” speaking to individuals like diplomats that 
were subject to the laws of another sovereign in terms of the issue, and 
not at all questioning the domicile issue. So it seems to me the lan-
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guage of the Fourteenth Amendment makes clear that what Congress 
was talking about was authority over the individual, not allegiance.  In 
fact, the leading legal interpretation of that language during this era is 
consistent with my position.  Looking to the 1882 Etymological Dic-
tionary of the English Language, the important dictionary of its day, 
you will see that it said that “subject to” basically means “laid or situ-
ated under . . . under the power or authority of another.”   
Modern day interpretation as well as subsequent Supreme Court 
interpretation is likewise consistent with my position.  As seen in the 
leading Supreme Court case interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Citizenship Clause – U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark4, where the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue – and where I suspect Professor 
Eastman will characterize as dicta –  he must characterize it as such 
because that Court’s language is so damning to his position.  The 
Court in Wong Kim Ark held that “every citizen subject of another 
country who is domiciled here is within the allegiance and protection, 
and consequently subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”  It 
can hardly be denied that an alien is completely subject to the political 
jurisdiction of this country in which he resides. I posit that this lan-
guage is far from dicta; it is the Supreme Court addressing a constitu-
tional amendment as to its scope and breadth completely.  
My interpretation is thus on point, unlike the Elk5 decision that 
Professor Eastman cites, which again was addressing the peculiar sta-
tus of Native Americans because of prior Supreme Court rulings, and 
unlike the Slaughterhouse Cases6, which didn’t address the citizenship 
clause.  Wong did.  Indeed, subsequent Supreme Court decisions also 
support my position and cases, like Plyler v. Doe7, specifically rejected 
punishing U.S.-born children for the wrongs of their undocumented 
parents, and taking it as a given that children born in the United 
States are United States citizens. 
A related point, in INS v. Rios-Pineda8, which I’m sure Professor 
Eastman will also characterize as dicta, also contains useful language.  
The Court recognized that in a matter involving deportation proceed-
ings that were instituted against respondents, who by that time had a 
child who, and the child being born in the United States, was a citizen. 
The last point I want to raise, think about the consequences of 
such Professor Eastman’s position.  We’re going to have situations 
where more individuals are excluded, more partial members of our 
                                                                                                                           
 4 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 5 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 6 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 7 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 8 471 U.S. 444 (1985). 
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society.  And as I alluded to in a recent book, Citizenship and its Ex-
clusions, that’s the last thing, given our less than ideal history on race 
relations, the country should be doing.  This country needs to be mov-
ing ahead to having a more inclusive society.  The consent-based 
Lockean theory that Professor Eastman refers to in his presentation, 
speaks to the fact of something akin to the primary and exclusive 
power of one branch of government.  According to Eastman’s view, 
Congress can do whatever Congress wants to do, including treating 
naturalized citizens differently than other citizens, and including creat-
ing levels of members of society, notwithstanding an American ethos 
that strongly suggests all citizens are equals.   
I will close with having you think of these scenarios:  Under a 
non-birthright citizenship scenario, parents that have overstayed their 
visas could have one child being a citizen and have another child be-
ing an undocumented individual.  Let’s look at another one:  How do 
we treat children of a relationship where you have one parent being a 
citizen and one parent being undocumented?  How do we decide 
that?  Mother?  Father?  Who’s older?  Younger?  We’re going to cre-
ate more levels and variances.  
Let me end with one thing, the classic statement that we hear at 
orientation.  Look to your left.  Do so, please.  Look to your right.  
Who’s a citizen?  How are we going to describe them?  If it is not go-
ing to be birthright, it’s going to be other things.  Maybe what we will 
have will be levels of Americans, based on the colors of green or lim-
ited citizenship cards, or other arguably challenging (and maybe illogi-
cal) conclusions.  Thank you.  
[applause] 
JOHN EASTMAN:  Okay.  So we’re both familiar with the draft-
ing debates in Congress.  I have a different reading of those debates, 
and I want to explore our differences a little bit because Professor 
Roman’s argument puts the two segments of the debate in conflict.  It 
puts the debate over Indians in conflict with the debate over Chinese 
and Gypsies.  And I do recognize that that exchange between Senator 
Cowan and Senator Conness is critical to understanding the meaning 
of the Citizenship Clause.  I just have a different take on it.  My take, I 
think, reconciles the two parts of the debate.  Yours has them in per-
manent conflict.  
So the issue in the Indian discussion was, because they owed alle-
giance to a separate sovereign, they would not be treated as subject to 
the jurisdiction even if born on U.S. soil.  And my claim is that that 
principle, that not owing allegiance to a foreign sovereign or the do-
mestic sovereign, as in the case of Indian tribes, was what they meant 
by “subject to the jurisdiction.”  So then you get this question by Sena-
tor Cowan, who was a bit of a racist, clearly opposed to the Fourteenth 
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Amendment generally.  He says, “If you’re going to do this, you’re go-
ing to give citizenship to the children of Gypsies and the children of 
Chinese.”  And Conness says, “Yes, that’s right.”  All right?  But it’s 
important to recognize the context in which that discussion occurs.  
There were efforts at the time to only allow citizenship for the chil-
dren of white European immigrants.  And what Conness is saying is it 
doesn’t matter what nationality they’re from, if they are lawfully, per-
manently domiciled – to use the language from Senator Trumbull in 
the letter to the President – permanently domiciled from whatever 
region in the world they came from, whatever their nationality, what-
ever their ethnic background, if they are lawfully, permanently domi-
ciled in the United States, their children will become citizens.  And it’s 
that distinction.  Because becoming lawfully, permanently domiciled in 
the United States, you have taken a step toward renouncing the for-
mer allegiances that gave the Senate trouble on the context of the 
Indian question, the other part of the debate.   
And so presented with that question, Senator Conness says, “Yes, 
they would.”  But significantly – before he says “yes, they would,” he 
says, “I fail to see how Cowan’s concerns relate to Section One, be-
cause he also claims that we’re going to give this to mere sojourners, if 
travelers come here.  Just because they get the protection of our laws, 
they’re not citizens, their children shouldn’t be.” And Conness says, “I 
fail to see how that concern relates to Section One.  But as to your 
question about the Gypsies, who are lawfully, permanently domiciled 
here, of course their children will be citizens.  That’s what we’re setting 
out in the Fourteenth Amendment.”  That retains the distinction be-
tween partial and territorial jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the 
more full and complete jurisdiction that Senator Howard talked 
about, on the other, which reconciles it with the discussion over Indi-
ans in the earlier part of the debate, and ties it more directly to the 
text of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Moreover, this reading of the discus-
sion is fully consistent with the Slaughterhouse Cases9 and Elk v. Wil-
kins
10, the Attorney General opinion, and the leading treatise writer of 
the day.  Not a dictionary author, but the leading treatise writer of the 
day, Thomas Cooley, to whom we often look for the definitive inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he was writing con-
temporaneously with it and was highly regarded.  And here’s what he 
says: “subject to jurisdiction” meant full and complete jurisdiction to 
which citizens are generally subject, and not any qualified and partial 
jurisdiction such as may consist with allegiance to some other gov-
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ernment.  And that was in the contemporaneous leading treatise of 
the day in the 1870s, the understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  I think that’s the correct understanding.  
Now, granted, in Wong Kim Ark 11 in 1898, during the course of 
the holding that Wong Kim Ark, who was the child of a lawful, perma-
nent resident – her parents were not allowed to become U.S. citizens 
because of a treaty that we entered into with the emperor of China 
that refused to recognize the right of expatriation, the natural right of 
expatriation, that our Declaration of Independence demands.  And so 
there was this treaty that we entered into contrary to one of our most 
basic principles.  In that context, the court held that their children, 
because they had done everything they could to become citizens of 
the United States that we would allow them to do, they’d become law-
ful, permanent residents.  We wouldn’t let them go any further.  The 
court held that their children were citizens.   
Now, in the course of that holding, the court has a lot of what I 
consider dicta.  Professor Roman would think it is essential to holding.  
I do not.  If you accept that there is a distinction between partial and 
territorial and complete and whole jurisdiction, then that other discus-
sion is dicta.  It’s clearly dicta in Plyler v. Doe12 and clearly dicta in INS 
v. Rios-Pineda
13.  This is why Judge Richard Posner on the Seventh 
Circuit has recently held that this is an open question. This is why 
Judge Sam Alito, when he was asked about this during his confirma-
tion hearing, refused to answer, saying, “Recent scholarship has dem-
onstrated that this is an open question.”  And the Supreme Court has 
actually not addressed the precise issue, which is whether the children 
of those who are not present in the U.S. lawfully, therefore not here 
with consent, not here fully subject to the jurisdiction, even though 
clearly subject to the partial or territorial jurisdiction that goes along 
with anybody within the territorial borders, whether those children 
are automatic citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
whether we need an act of Congress to provide that above the floor of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  I believe it remains an open question, 
and I suspect we’re going to see litigation over it very soon.  Thank 
you.  
[applause] 
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  I want to address a few inconsistencies 
that were raised by my able opponent.  And the first one he makes, he 
refers to the Trumbull letter to President Johnson.  And I was quite 
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impressed, because when he referred to that letter, he talked about 
lawful, permanently domiciled.  Unfortunately, the letter doesn’t refer 
to that language – Professor Eastman included the word “lawfully” 
into the letter.  So by adding that language, he assists his position.  
Sadly, the language “lawfully” is not in the letter. 
In terms of the determination of whether a treatise writer versus 
a plain meaning understanding of a term is dispositive, I perhaps will 
switch hats and take the textualist approach, to take the classic view of 
the understanding of a word.  And when we think of the word being 
subject to the laws of the state of Florida, it’s entirely consistent with 
the understanding of the day and the understanding of, essentially, 
every case, not just Supreme Court case, that recognizes “subject to 
the law” as the fact that you have to obey the laws of your jurisdiction.  
And again, center to the discussion with respect to all of these issues 
was the focus on being domiciled within the jurisdiction.   
Looking to the language that alludes to allegiance, as I referenced 
before, Congress was referring to that illogical and arguably immoral 
position by a previous Supreme Court in creating a fiction of having 
sovereigns within a sovereign, and yet being wards of the first sover-
eign.    And again, the Wong Kim Ark case has to be dicta for his posi-
tion, and the reason for this is that the Court was so explicit and un-
equivocal on that matter that most scholars view the issue as resolved 
by the case.  In fact the quote in question is actually a very long, and I 
want to just take a moment to refer to it, because it does speak to the 
full scope and breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment.  None of the 
cases he cites, Supreme Court or otherwise, come close to addressing 
this issue.  “The Fourteenth Amendment affirms, as I have said, the 
ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the terri-
tory.  The amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes 
children born within the territory of the United States . . . .” The other 
person’s language referred to by Professor Eastman, again, consis-
tently being the children of diplomats and enemy combatants in that 
context.  And the powerful language of Wong Kim Ark is at the very 
end of this quote, “Every citizen subject of another country while 
domiciled here is within the allegiance,” essentially prophetically, say-
ing, “Professor Eastman, I know you’re going to raise this issue a hun-
dred years later, and this is how I’m going to respond.”  Every person 
born in the United States, outside the previously recognized exception 
of Indigenous People, is consequently subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.  It can hardly be denied that an alien is completely sub-
ject to the political jurisdiction of the country in which he resides.  
Following the plain meaning understanding of the day, legislative lan-
guage of the day, Supreme Court interpretations subsequent to this 
language, and, more importantly, following the common law that we 
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adopted from England that never deviated with respect to birthright 
citizenship being fundamental, domicile being fundamental, to a de-
termination of citizenship.  Thank you.  
[applause] 
JOHN EASTMAN:  Well, let me start off with a question, and it 
was raised by Professor Roman’s sur-reply.  What is the law in Eng-
land?   
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  Well, in terms of the law in . . .  
JOHN EASTMAN:  You just mentioned the common law in 
England.  I’m curious.  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  Basically the law was consistent with the 
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, that citizenship was 
based on being born there.  And the exceptions were consistent in 
both statutes that made the exception for diplomats and made the 
exception for others including those. . .  
JOHN EASTMAN:  But you have to concede that we rejected at 
least part of the jus soli doctrine.  The jus soli doctrine said everybody 
born on British soil is a British citizen or subject and can never re-
nounce it.  Those were the two sides of the jus soli doctrine.  And we 
clearly rejected the back end side of it.  I mean, the Declaration of 
Independence is the greatest example in human history of a rejection 
of jus soli on the natural right to renounce your allegiance.  Now, that 
doesn’t necessarily mean that we also rejected the front end, but we 
clearly rejected at least the back end part of the English jus soli doc-
trine in the common law.  And when we talk about that we inherited 
English common law, it is always with the caveat to the extent consis-
tent with the principles of the Declaration of Independence.  So we 
clearly reject at least that portion, the expatriation portion, of the 
English common law, and the issue for us is did we also reject the front 
end portion of it as well.  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  No, I think that’s a good point.  But the 
fact of the matter is that it has never been discussed in terms of the 
potential for rejection.  The language you’re referring to in Elk14 is an 
odd conclusion in light of a fiction that is created by a group, and we 
know the racialized nature of the Elk15 decision and the subordinate 
nature and treatment of the other in that context.  So in terms of our 
understanding, there was no rejection.  In fact, there’s been repeated 
acceptance at every level: the numerous citations that I gave in terms 
of the legislative history, the Supreme Court cases, and particularly 
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Wong
16, that focused on the full scope of the language, repeated and 
consistent executive interpretation, not only by the President, but the 
agencies of that language.  
So we’re really looking at a proposition that seeks to change 
hundreds of years of practice and interpretation.  And the burden 
would fall on my opponent with respect to that with clear intent in 
terms of what was to be done.  I don’t think he meant it.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Questions from the audience?  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  How would you propose, Professor 
Eastman, to implement this?  Would it be a prospective implementa-
tion?  And so we would not have retroactive implementation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Yeah, there are a couple of things on the 
way to answering that I think are important to note.  Professor Roman 
said that every government agency has always assumed this view.  I 
don’t think that’s accurate.  And this is a longwinded way to get to 
your question, but I’ll get there.  For example, in dealing with the In-
dian question, even after Wong Kim Ark17, if it stood for the broad 
proposition that anybody born on U.S. soil, no matter what the rela-
tionship that their parents were to the United States, we would not 
have had a series of tribe-by-tribe statutes extending citizenship by 
naturalization rather than birthright by Congress, culminating in the 
1923-1924 act of Indian citizenship.   
We would have had claims of citizenship arising out of the 1920s 
guest worker program.  And there’s been a wonderful documentary 
that I participated in talking about some of the pretty rough repatria-
tion efforts that went on after the Great Depression hit in the late 
1920s.  Lots of people here in the 1920s on the guest worker program 
were removed after the Depression because of the lack of jobs.  As far 
as I’ve been able to tell, nobody raised the issue that the children that 
were being removed with them were citizens.  The same thing in the 
Bracero program, lots of people here in that guest worker program, 
undoubtedly means that lots of children were born on U.S. soil while 
they were here.  But at the end of the Bracero program, nobody’s rais-
ing the issue, even as late as the 1950s, that you’re sending U.S. citizen 
children back to whatever country the guest worker had come from.  
So this notion of automatic birth, I think, is a reflection more of a 
changed understanding of the language than what they had under-
stood previously. 
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What I would do, though, and I’m fully willing to concede that, at 
least over the last 30 or 40 years, we have believed the notion that 
birth was all that was required, and that people that have relied on 
that, there’s a huge reliance interest.  And so what I would do is I 
would just grandfather that in and make this policy forward, and then 
immediately give to Congress the ability, if they think that’s too strin-
gent a floor that the Fourteenth Amendment sets out, they can (by 
their naturalization authority) grant citizenship as far beyond that as 
they think appropriate.  And there are very good policy arguments on 
both sides on why we should extend it very broadly, or a little, or 
somewhere in between.  But my point is the Fourteenth Amendment 
doesn’t decide those questions a priori.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Professor Roman?  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  If I may comment, I do, once again, ac-
knowledge that at-first-blush, the strength of Professor Eastman’s ar-
gument.  But let’s look at the sources and citations that support that 
proposition.  We’re looking at the treatment of indigenous people and 
the creation of them as others and outsiders and less than citizens, 
wards, dependent, inferior people.  Isn’t it a sad day that we have a 
proposition here that could have the effect in modern day times of 
treating people that were born in the United States as others and less 
than equal, to use the Supreme Court, racist Supreme Court decisions 
like Elk18.   
And my second point, is a related one, where my opponent points 
out that there were no objections in terms of the writings and other 
means when the United States ended programs like the Bracero and 
guest worker programs of the past.  Professor Eastman stated: 
Lots of people here in the 1920s on the guest worker program 
were removed after the Depression because of the lack of jobs.  As far 
as I’ve been able to tell, nobody raised the issue that the children that 
were being removed with them were citizens.  The same thing in the 
Bracero program, lots of people here in that guest worker program, 
undoubtedly means that lots of children were born on U.S. soil while 
they were here.  But at the end of the Bracero program, nobody’s rais-
ing the issue, even as late as the 1950s, that you’re sending U.S. citizen 
children back to whatever country the guest worker had come from. 
I would venture to say there were a lot of objections, but they 
weren’t people who were writing law review articles, or who had sig-
nificant political influence at that time.  They were largely poor people 
being deported in round ups, such as the ones in Operation Wetback, 
despite the fact many were born in the United States. To the extent 
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they did not complain, the reason for this is not because our process 
was fair, but because our system was so unfair and was stratified with 
only some having access and ability to address their objections.  More 
recently, when this academy became more diverse, professors like my-
self and others have written on that very same subject--on citizenship 
and the absurdity in terms of immigration, in terms of the treatment of 
individuals that were otherwise considered citizens, or should have 
been considered citizens, were deported.  In fact, several Chicano 
studies’ scholars have written several decades ago in terms of justice 
and equity.  So there were people that complained.  They were just not 
the people in power, or those that had access to the bully pulpit.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Second row?  Yes.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Has there ever been a history of legis-
lative bodies throughout government that argue what you’re arguing 
now, that we should deny citizenship to those born in the United 
States?  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Most nations in the world do not give auto-
matic citizenship to the children of visiting foreigners.  And that’s true 
whether they’re lawfully and certainly unlawfully present, that the 
notion of birth be deemed automatic citizenship is rather rare.  Even 
the British, where the institution was originated, have moved away 
from it in the context of those who are unlawfully present, and even, I 
think, temporarily legally present, in Great Britain.  So this view that 
no matter what the circumstance of how you got to the United States, 
birth on its soil is sufficient, is the real outlier.  
Now, that alone is not sufficient.  The United States is an excep-
tional country.  The fact that we’re an outlier might be a good thing 
rather than a bad thing.  We have to look at what it is.  But it’s clearly 
an outlier position, I think, in modern law.  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  I agree with that in terms of what more 
and more countries are doing in terms of addressing the issue of citi-
zenship.  And I’m troubled by it, because at the end of the day, this is 
really not about birthright citizenship and full membership.  This is 
about how you address the immigration debate.  What we are talking 
about is the hateful rhetoric of immigration and its consequences.  
And as I pointed out in yesterday’s presentation, and in one of my 
forthcoming books, in terms of the empirical studies, from all sides of 
the political spectrum, the U.S. government, the Congressional Re-
search Council, National Research Council, even the Cato Institute, 
that have looked at the impact of undocumented immigration and 
recognized the positive, net positive, in a fiscal sense.  Yet, what many 
policy makers do is that they blame undocumented immigration for 
our ills and seek to curb citizenship in order to further attack per-
2011] Debate on Birthright Citizenship 311 
ceived outsiders. Think about the ripple affect of such measures, espe-
cially in terms of race relations in this country. 
So what do we do?  We start parceling off our views on who can 
be citizens?  We close borders?  We make fences? Now we say, “You 
folks that used to be citizens, and we’ve always interpreted those like 
you as citizens, but we are now changing our minds.” We will be creat-
ing more and more “others” in our political and democratic landscape. 
I do not believe that is the right way to go.  Let’s address the issue in 
economic terms between the states and the federal government, and 
find some real solutions instead of this kind of knee-jerk reactions.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Let me, if I could, ask a question that I 
had during the comments, and that goes to the legislative history.  And 
I don’t know if this is legislative history or more of a transmittal 
document.  But you used the word “lawfully domiciled,” and then Pro-
fessor Roman referenced that saying that it does not say “lawfully 
domiciled,” and that struck me as a fairly significant point to address.  
JOHN EASTMAN:  It is a significant point.  And he’s right, the 
word “lawfully” is not there.  It says “permanently living domiciled in 
the United States.”  But the word “domiciled” meant you had to be 
lawfully a resident.  Just somebody that was there unlawfully was not 
considered to be domiciled.  You had to be there with permission with 
intent to stay permanently.  That was all encapsulated in the word 
“domiciled.”  So I added the “lawfully” shorthand to convey what the 
word “domiciled” meant.  It was something different than mere so-
journer status or residency.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Other questions?  Front row.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  This is for Dean Eastman.  How does 
your position treat a child who parents were born a citizen and [indis-
cernible]?  Would it follow other countries that would [indiscernible]?  
And would then [indiscernible] judge or discrimination?  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Yeah.  This is a question that has plagued 
the political theorists for centuries, because we make several assump-
tions.  When you move to a consent-based model, as I believe we did, 
the first assumption is that a child born is giving consent to joining a 
particular political regime.  We infer that consent from the status of 
the parents.  So that’s inference number one.  The way the political 
theorists have played this out is, if a child is born to parents that owe 
allegiance to different sovereignties, that the child is presumptive citi-
zen of both until he comes of age and makes an election to choose one 
or the other.  They didn’t recognize the notion of dual citizenship, be-
cause that meant dual allegiances, which was a contradiction in terms 
for them.  And so the way they played this out was by these assump-
tions.  So what that means is a child of a U.S. citizen and non-U.S. citi-
312 FIU Law Review [6:293 
zen would be subject to the jurisdiction through whichever parent was 
the U.S. citizen and would be a birthright citizen.  
The difficulty is that, if the child was born on U.S. soil to, say, to a 
French mother and an American father, the French would recognize 
through the mother French citizenship as well.  That creates a dual 
allegiance that was a contradiction in terms.  And once the child 
comes of age, the ideal would be, “I choose the French citizenship over 
the American,” or visa versa.  In practice, it’s where I end up staying 
and living and domiciling indicates which choice I’ve made and then 
they’re the citizen of that one.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  I think there was a question from – 
yes.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Dean Chapman . . .  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Eastman.  At Chapman.  It’s all right.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  You never really addressed Professor 
Roman’s policy argument.  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Because I think they’re policy arguments, 
and that means I think they’re appropriate for Congress in its exercise 
of its naturalization power.  They’re not interpretive arguments on 
where the Fourteenth Amendment’s floor is.  I do think there are – the 
biggest policy argument is, mine is a more complicated system to run, 
because I’ve got to ascertain the character, the classification, the status 
of the parent, in order to know whether the child is an automatic citi-
zen or not.  Then that creates a level of complexity, I think, that’s in-
herent in a consent-based model rather than a jus soli model.  And so 
that’s certainly a policy argument on why we might want to offer citi-
zenship to everyone born on U.S. soil, no matter what the circum-
stances.   
I think there are very strong arguments on the other side, particu-
larly in the context of unlawful immigration.  If we’re going to recog-
nize the principle that we cannot be simply open to unlimited immi-
gration without undermining the institutions of this society – and 
there’s some people who disagree with that, that the net benefit over 
time, once you get over the short-term frictions in such a system, that 
the net benefits outweigh it and we ought to do it.  But there are costs 
in that, particularly with a standard of living much higher than most of 
the rest of the places in the world.  An unlimited amount of immigra-
tion without any time restraints can radically alter our ability to de-
liver social services, what have you.  And so there are huge costs.  And 
if you accept that proposition, then how much immigration to allow 
and how quickly to allow it is a policy judgment assigned to Congress.  
And if you say that, then things that allow you to end run those 
policy judgments – I happen to think the policy judgments that are in 
place right now are much too restrictive.  But if you concede that 
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there needs to be a policy judgment made by law, and then you allow 
end runs around it through unlawful immigration, you’ve undercut 
that policy judgment and effectively repudiated the notion that Con-
gress is the one we’ve assigned that policy judgment to.   
And, quite frankly, I think we would end up more quickly with a 
much more generous and much more efficient streamlined lawful im-
migration process if we had not allowed 10- to 20-million unlawful 
immigrants to come here.  The pressure on business to – I mean, big 
business, big agricultural as well as big labor, if they wanted to in-
crease the lawful immigration and streamline the process, that’s a coa-
lition who could get anything through Congress in ten minutes if it 
wanted to.  But unlawful immigration has allowed them a safety valve 
not to push that, and it’s a safety valve that they have benefitted from, 
immorally in my view, by having what is akin to slave labor, people 
living in the shadows who cannot even complain about maltreatment 
for fear of deportation.  I think that’s unconscionable.  But where we 
disagree is I think the strategy to put pressure to legalize more and 
streamline more, that gets undercut if you eyewink the unlawful trade, 
is the better course.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  The gentleman – I’ve been trying not – 
because I saw your arm getting tired, but we didn’t make eye contact.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  I wanted to know what would happen 
in the case of a child born of foreign nationals who is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign power because it would be stateless and 
ineligible to gain citizenship from another country.  
JOHN EASTMAN:  There’s only a few countries in the world 
that that would exist for.  And in the current citizenship bills that are 
being proposed in a number of state legislatures, we address by that by 
just saying that “subject to the jurisdiction” means not subject to any 
foreign power, or a child who would owe no allegiance to any other 
foreign power otherwise would be a citizen.  And so the stateless kid 
problem we solve by just saying that – what they were trying to do is 
avoid an allegiance to a foreign power.  If you have no allegiance to 
the foreign power because the foreign powers don’t recognize it, then 
you would be a citizen by mere birth, because there would be no other 
place where are you subject to the jurisdiction.  The language, I think, 
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act is more clear on this: not owing allegiance 
to any foreign power.  And the stateless child doesn’t owe allegiance 
to any foreign power, so birth on U.S. soil would convey citizenship.     
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  I did want to address a point that Profes-
sor Eastman seems to be approaching--immigration, and I think that’s 
at the heart or what’s behind a lot of these discussions and debates.  I 
think we have found a point of agreement, perhaps a significant point 
of agreement, in terms of how to address the relative strain and bene-
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fits to our society.  But where we do differ is the proposition that end-
ing birthright citizenship is somehow an appropriate response. There 
needs to be some agreement on ways to address immigration, be it 
through a more conservative approach, like guest workers program, or 
perhaps programs like roads to citizenship.  What is not working is 
people living in the shadows. I do not think the resolution is to create 
levels of membership and therefore inferiority.  We’ve moved so far 
and it took so long, be it in the context of women rights, and continued 
struggles with others in terms of the LGBT community and other out-
sider groups.  The thought of creating formally partial membership, I 
think it’s unsound.  It would lead to bad results and perhaps worse.  
I do think the Court, in looking at this, won’t be limited just to the 
legislative history, because the burden of changing a policy that has 
been consistently applied – though we differ somewhat on whether 
this is in fact the case – of changing a policy that is quite set, in my 
mind.  That burden would necessarily be on Professor Eastman’s side 
of ending birthright citizenship – to show some benefits associated 
with it, not more strife, not more inconsistency, not more exclusion.  I 
certainly wouldn’t want to see that in this country.  I would want to 
see, irrespective of how we get there, some reform that addresses the 
issues that are before us.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Professor Travis, then fourth row, then 
second row, then you’re going.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  [indiscernible] the balance [indiscerni-
ble] for corporations being persons in the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?  And related to that, would Professor East-
man’s view make foreign corporations born overseas [indiscernible] 
infants born in the United States be portable and retainable, indefi-
nitely losing all their rights.  
JOHN EASTMAN:  And can I make independent expenditures 
now that Citizens United is on the table?  There’s no discussion about 
personhood for corporations in the debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  That’s something that the court kind of comes to later.  
But I do want to reject the notion – there’s a move afoot to kind of get 
rid of any notions of national sovereignty.  It was kind of one of the 
new avant-garde waves in international law that – because every na-
tional sovereignty, every national border, classifies and distinguishes 
between those who are citizens of that nation and citizens of any other 
nation.  I don’t think there’s any inferiority implied one way or an-
other in there.  If children are born here of Irish parents while they’re 
visiting in the United States on a vacation to Disney World – I was 
going to say Disneyland, but that’s my end of the country – then the 
child is an Irish citizen under my view.  And when they return from 
their vacation they’re back in Ireland.  That doesn’t imply any inferior-
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ity one way or another.  It just recognizes that there are different po-
litical communities in every part of the globe.   
What we’ve got – and a huge draw because of our economy, be-
cause of our institutions – that a lot of people who are not part of our 
political community would like to become part of our political com-
munity.  And the question is how best to manage that demand for new 
entrance into our political community.  And we can say, “Well, we 
shouldn’t manage at all, just let as many people come as they want all 
at once, no matter how they get here, lawfully/unlawfully,” I think that 
is a recipe rife with the kind of problems we’ve seen.  And the reason 
I’m focusing on birthrights citizenship here.  If we take the Fourteenth 
Amendment out of the question at all, I think we still have a serious 
policy question.  I suspect you have it here.  I know we have it in Cali-
fornia.  A huge and largely underground, almost a human trafficking 
birth tourism industry that exists because of this notion of birthright 
citizenship.  I think if you take that away as one of the draws for illegal 
conduct and offset it by increase in streamlined processes for legal 
conduct, I think we would all be better off.  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  I guess we would differ in terms of 
whether there would be a mark or a stain to have someone born here 
and have a sibling born here, one being a citizen and one being an-
other an outsider or partial member of this society.  We have a long 
and, at the very least, checkered history in terms of inconsistent appli-
cation of our democratic ethos, I would not want us to resort to those 
eras. I think the Elk case is great example of making people who 
would otherwise be citizens, being treated as less than equals.   I don’t 
think moving towards more gradations of membership would resolve 
anything.  
I think we can resolve, or at least engage in honest discussion 
about immigration.  And because you believe in birthright citizenship 
does not mean you believe in open borders.  I for one do not.  And I 
for one – believe I’m one of the fairly rare academics leaning on the 
left, very pro-immigrant advocate, that acknowledges the strain, be-
cause I’ve looked at the empirical work.  I don’t believe it’s as stark 
long term as some of the rhetoric goes on.  I’d love to see studies.  I’m 
unfamiliar with any on the birthright tourism.  I’m not sure how you 
described it.  It’ll be an interesting conversation.  But we need to have 
open and honest conversations.  We don’t need more rhetoric and we 
certainly do not need more partial and inferior members.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  I think I said fourth row over in the 
gray, and then we’ll move here and over there.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is it true that the United States is one 
of the only countries that recognizes expatriation and the right to an-
nounce your allegiance to your country?  
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JOHN EASTMAN:  No, no, no.  We’re one of the only nations 
that recognize birthright citizenship anymore.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Okay.  Well, during the Declaration of 
Independence [indiscernible] that you have the right to [indiscerni-
ble].  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Right.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  So what would you say to the notion 
that once a non-legal is in the United States that they can expatriate 
from the nation that they came from?  Wouldn’t that make them not 
subject to the country they came from anymore, therefore they’d be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because of their expa-
triation?  
JOHN EASTMAN:  They can, except the expatriation model 
flows from the consent model.  And you have the natural right to re-
nounce your allegiance.  That doesn’t give you a natural right to de-
mand that somebody else welcome you into their allegiance.  It’s a 
mutual consent requirement.  And one of the early stories about the 
Indian context, at some point the United States government said, 
“Okay, you’re all citizens.”  And they said, “Well, wait a minute.  That’s 
a nice offer, but we only become citizens if we accept your offer.”  
There’s a bilateral consent, and I think there needs to be a bilateral 
consent there.  And where I believe the Fourteenth Amendment drew 
the line is, if you have migrated to this country legally, taken up per-
manent residence in accord with our laws, we have now on the United 
States side manifested our consent.  You by doing so have manifested 
your consent.  Your children will be citizens.  But if you are here by 
definition contrary to our laws, then by definition you don’t have that 
consent on the United States side, so there has to be some other the-
ory for your children to be citizens other than consent.  And I fully 
concede that there are a lot of pre-Civil War cases, antebellum cases, 
that just kind of unthinkingly apply the old British common law, be-
cause we adopted the old British common law to the extent not incon-
sistent with the Declaration.  My point is, when they finally got around 
to kind of digging down into what that meant and realized that it was 
contrary to the consent principle, they changed it.  And that’s what the 
Fourteenth Amendment did.  He disagrees.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Second row, the young woman.  I’m 
sorry, I’m blanking.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Don’t worry.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:   And I see lots of hands, but I’m trying 
to call on folks that haven’t yet spoken.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Miriam.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Yeah.  
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AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Okay.  Dean Eastman, you mentioned 
several times that . . .  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  I’m sorry.  If I could interrupt, I had a 
thought up here before you start, and I see some students are leaving.  
We have these debates in schools all the time.  Before you go, and be-
fore folks leave.  And I think that it would be fascinating to turn this 
into a bit of a focus group.  So I’m going to ask that, before you leave, 
you leave a piece of paper up here with either “Eastman,” “Roman,” 
or “tied.” I’m not sure if I’m going to announce it, but I’m curious . . .  
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  I’m getting a grade? 
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  That’s why I’m not taking a public 
vote.  That’s why I’m just saying leave a piece of paper right by . . .  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Or how about, “I don’t agree with him, but 
he made some good points.” 
EDIBERTO ROMAN:  There we go.  
[laughter] 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  I think that makes good sense.  
DEAN ALEX ACOSTA:  Second row.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  You mentioned several times that [in-
discernible] power of a [indiscernible], and I think that [indiscernible] 
based on the wrong thing, which is [indiscernible].  However, in light 
of Marbury v. Madison and judicial review, to what extent do you 
think the court has the power to overturn potentially unconstitutional 
immigration legislation, for example, provisions that arguably violate 
equal protection.  
JOHN EASTMAN:  Yes, a very good question.  The Congress in 
the exercise of its plenary power cannot violate other provisions of the 
Constitution.  So if the floor of automatic citizenship is as high as Pro-
fessor Roman says it is, if Congress tried to define citizenship lower 
than that, that would be unconstitutional.  If the floor is where I say it 
is, they couldn’t even go below that floor, that would be unconstitu-
tional.  But how far above the floor is an exercise of their plenary 
power?  And so what we’re trying to do is to define what that constitu-
tional floor is.  And I think if Congress violates that floor, wherever it 
is, it would be unconstitutional.  That you agree with, right?  We found 
another area of agreement.  We just disagree on where the floor is.  
 
